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May 9, 2024 · Daniel B. Garrie

Guidance for CISOs After United States v. Sullivan and SEC v. SolarWinds

Two landmark enforcement actions have reshaped CISO personal liability. Here is what Sullivan and SolarWinds mean for disclosure, documentation, and the CISO-counsel relationship.

For most of the profession's history, the Chief Information Security Officer operated in the engine room of the enterprise: respected internally, largely invisible externally, and rarely a target of personal legal exposure. Two enforcement actions have changed that calculus. The criminal conviction of Uber's former security chief, Joe Sullivan, in connection with the company's handling of a 2016 data breach, and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's enforcement action against SolarWinds and its CISO, signaled that security leaders can be held personally accountable for how breaches are managed and disclosed. Read together, these matters do not announce a single new rule so much as they crystallize a trend: the conduct, candor, and documentation of the security function are now squarely within the field of legal scrutiny.

What These Matters Actually Signal

The Sullivan matter arose from how a breach was characterized and handled after the fact, rather than from the breach itself. The lesson is that the response to an incident, including how it is described internally and to regulators, can carry greater legal consequence than the intrusion that prompted it. The SolarWinds action, in turn, brought the SEC's attention to the gap between a company's public security representations and its internal understanding of its actual security posture. Whatever the ultimate disposition of any particular claim, the throughline is consistent: regulators and prosecutors are willing to look past the corporate entity to the individuals who shaped security messaging and disclosure decisions.

For CISOs, the practical takeaway is not to retreat into silence or to over-promise in public-facing materials. It is to ensure that what the organization says about its security program, in marketing copy, in securities filings, in regulatory submissions, and in incident notifications, is supported by what the organization actually does. Misalignment between representation and reality is the exposure.

Disclosure Has Become a Discipline, Not a Reflex

The SEC's cybersecurity disclosure rules, which call for timely reporting of material cybersecurity incidents and periodic disclosure of risk management and governance practices, have made disclosure a recurring, structured obligation rather than an episodic scramble. CISOs at public companies, and increasingly those advising them, should treat materiality assessment as a cross-functional process owned jointly by security, legal, finance, and disclosure committees, not a judgment the security team makes alone.

In practice, this means establishing in advance how the organization will evaluate whether an incident is material, who participates in that determination, and how the analysis is recorded. It also means recognizing that the same facts may trigger overlapping obligations under sector regulators, state breach-notification statutes, and contractual commitments to customers. A defensible disclosure posture is one that can show a reasoned, contemporaneous process, even where reasonable people might have reached a different conclusion.

Documentation Is Now a Form of Defense

If there is one operational change every CISO should make in response to these developments, it is to treat documentation as a deliverable. Risk assessments, remediation decisions, accepted-risk acknowledgments, and incident timelines should be created contemporaneously, written with the assumption that a regulator or jury may one day read them, and preserved consistently.

Equally important is candor in internal communications. Optimistic or dismissive characterizations of known weaknesses, captured in email or chat, can later be contrasted with external assurances to damaging effect. The goal is not to manufacture a flattering record but to maintain an honest one. A CISO who can demonstrate that risks were identified, escalated to the right people, and addressed reasonably under the circumstances is in a fundamentally stronger position than one whose record is sparse, inconsistent, or contradicted by informal correspondence.

Rebuilding the CISO-Counsel Relationship

Perhaps the most consequential shift is relational. The CISO and the general counsel can no longer operate as occasional collaborators who meet during a crisis. The security leader needs counsel involved in the design of the disclosure process, in the framing of public security representations, and in incident response from the earliest hours, when privilege and characterization decisions are made.

CISOs should also press their boards and general counsel on the question of personal protection: the scope of directors-and-officers coverage, indemnification commitments, and access to independent counsel where the individual's interests and the company's may diverge. These are not signs of disloyalty; they are markers of a mature governance structure that recognizes the security leader now bears genuine personal exposure.

How Law & Forensics Helps

Law & Forensics works at the intersection of cybersecurity, digital forensics, and the law, advising CISOs, general counsel, and boards on incident response, materiality and disclosure analysis, defensible documentation practices, and the governance structures that protect both the organization and the individuals who lead its security function. Our team helps clients align their security representations with their security reality, build records that withstand regulatory scrutiny, and navigate the increasingly personal stakes of the modern CISO role.

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